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PIRACY AND SLAVE TRADING IN ACTION IN CLASSICAL 
AND HELLENISTIC GREECE* 
          
David M. Lewis1 
 
ABSTRACT: Most slaves in the Greek world were imported non-Greeks and their offspring. Yet little 
is known of the entry into slavery of individuals from the non-Greek periphery. Far more 
promising for studying entry into slavery is a less numerically significant process, piracy, where 
the capture and sale of individuals – mainly Greeks - is extensively documented. Piracy was both 
a form of labour in itself, and a means of acquiring labour. The aim of this article is to explore the 
pragmatic aspects of capture and sale, as well as the extent to which the practice of ransoming 
prisoners kept captives away from entering the slave supply, by studying the pirate crew’s work, 
the technology at its disposal, and the fate of its victims. 
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The Classical and Hellenistic slave supply comprised a complex mesh of 
trade routes, markets, and merchants, whose commodity – enslaved human 
beings – was fed into this network by a variety of processes. Of the several 
mechanisms by which individuals can enter slavery (see Lewis, 2018, p. 318), 
virtually all can be seen in play in the Greek world, their relative significance 
fluctuating from place to place and shifting across time. Amid this flux, though, 
we can track some fairly consistent and high-volume currents of enslaved 
humanity operative over the long term. For example, slaves from Anatolia, 
especially Phrygia, regularly appear in our sources (and often in significant 
numbers) from the sixth century BC through to the Roman period, as do slaves 
from the Black Sea and Thrace.2 
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2 Anatolia, esp. Phrygia: see Lewis, 2011; 2015; 2018a; 2018b, p. 277-286. Black Sea and Danubian 
regions: Finley, 1962; Avram, 2007; Fischer, 2016; Thrace: Velkov, 1964. 
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However, when it comes to reconstructing the processes of enslavement 
and the supply chains that linked these “barbarian” sources with buyers in the 
marts of the Aegean city-states, we are at once confronted with the limitations of 
our evidence: though detailed in places, it is extremely patchy when taken in 
aggregate, with vital parts of the puzzle missing.3 Indeed, despite the numerical 
importance of Thracian and Phrygian slaves, it is next to impossible to write a 
social history of their initial enslavement and entry into the domain of 
commercial transactions, or at least a detailed one. We have a case for greater 
optimism, though, regarding one of the less numerically significant processes of 
enslavement in the Greek world: piracy.4 This article explores the entry of 
individuals into slavery by sketching the practical aspects of kidnap and sale that, 
over many centuries, removed thousands of individuals into a life of slavery. 
Recent work has stressed the need to reconstruct the social lives of slaves by 
examining their networks of interaction and experiences beyond the 
asymmetrical owner-slave dialectic (e.g. Vlassopoulos, 2011). We do not possess 
for antiquity the sort of narratives that survive for the Early Modern period 
whereby individuals related their kidnap and sale by Barbary corsairs;5 nor can 
we reconstruct the social history of slaves in transit with anything like the degree 
of detail achieved in, say, Rediker’s The Slave Ship: A Human History (2007).6  
But by piecing together the data scattered throughout our sources, we can at least 
construct a framework that allows us to understand better the initial stages of this 
branch of the slave supply, and the experiences of individuals thus enslaved. 
This essay will address our topic in two parts. Part I examines Greek 
piracy from the vantage point of the pirate crew and analyses its work, examining 
the technology at its disposal and how it was put into use. Much important work 
has been published in recent years on various facets of ancient piracy,7 but one 
                                                   
3 I have essayed a reconstruction (admittedly, sketchy) of the Anatolian-Aegean trade in Lewis, 
2015; further thoughts in Lewis, 2018b, p. 277-286. 
4 That piracy was not a first-rank source of slaves in the Greek world has been convincingly shown 
by Garlan, 1987. 
5 Vitkus, 2001; see also Milton, 2004. 
6 Besides, the duration of ancient Eastern Mediterranean voyages was much less than the Atlantic 
routes discussed by Rediker (see in general Arnaud 2005); and there is no reason to believe in 
specialized slave ships for the Greek world. 
7 For the political/historiographical facet, see Avidov, 1998; de Souza, 1999; Wiemer, 2002; 
Criscuolo, 2013. For the socio-economic facet, see Gabrielsen, 2001; 2003; 2013a; 2013b. For a 
comparative approach, see Rauh, 1998. See also Perrier, 2008 and the recent edited volumes of 
Braccesi, 2004; Grieb and Todt, 2012; Jaspert e Kolditz 2013. 
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notable area of neglect lies in the pragmatic issue of how it played out in practice. 
Various contributions have been made over the years regarding the technical 
attributes of this or that vessel used by pirates (on which, see infra), but the last 
attempt to describe comprehensively how they were utilised was published in 
1924.8 Here, I offer an up-to-date overview of the pirate crew’s practice so that 
our understanding of this aspect of the slave supply might be grounded in a firmer 
appreciation of its practical details. Part II considers the fate of kidnap victims, 
and takes into its purview the marketing of captives and their chances of ransom 
or release. No scholar has provided a more sophisticated analysis of Greek piracy 
than Vincent Gabrielsen, whose work has inter alia addressed the topic of the 
‘ransom market.’ He has shown convincingly that ransoming captives was more 
profitable that selling them into slavery (Gabrielsen, 2003, p. 392-395). But other 
considerations beyond profit influenced the decision to engage in ransom 
negotiations over making off with captives and selling them, and these will form 
the focus of section II. This will, I hope, contribute to a finer-grained 
understanding of the circumstances that governed whether captives would enter 
the broader currents of the slave trade or be re-united with their kin. 
 
1. The Pirate Crew and its Work 
 
The phenomenon of piracy in the ancient Mediterranean and adjacent 
seas was far from uniform.9 Its most prominent forms in the classical and 
Hellenistic Aegean, however, shared some common traits and emerged from 
comparable socioeconomic structures. These structures were widespread in the 
Aegean before 500 BC, and persisted in several regions thereafter. It was the last 
decades of the sixth century BC that saw the emergence of large trireme fleets 
whose efficacy rested on fiscal structures of growing complexity, a phenomenon 
that developed in tandem with processes of state formation in many of the more 
city-states. These fleets were state-owned, their crews salaried, and their 
activities determined by state policy. Prior to these developments, naval violence 
was largely a private affair: galleys typically rather smaller than triremes (such as 
                                                   
8 Ormerod, 1924, p. 13-58. Ferone, 1997, p. 117-137 contains a chapter entitled ‘Le imbarcazioni e 
le techniche di assalto’ but largely discusses vessel types. Useful partial discussions can be found 
in Casson, 1958 and Beresford, 2013, p. 238-257. 
9 On the variety of its forms see Garlan, 1978. For Black Sea piracy, see Tsetskhladze, 2000-1. 
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pentekontoroi and triakontoroi), owned and fitted out by members of the elite 
for plundering expeditions, and which could be mustered by the emergent states 
in times of war; but these were not polis-fleets proper (see van Wees, 2013). 
As Gabrielsen has shown, the late sixth century to early fifth century 
represents a turning point, one that saw Greek societies cluster into two camps.10 
On the one hand were the more politically and economically advanced poleis that 
maintained state-owned fleets and made the exercise of naval violence into a 
public monopoly. On the other hand were more traditional communities that 
cleaved to what Scholten (2000, p. 2) calls the “archaic code of freewheeling, 
predatory economic self-service”. In such regions, members of the elite still fitted 
out summer plundering voyages in the time-honoured Homeric manner; it was 
social conservatism, not social breakdown, that accounts for the association 
between piracy and regions such as Crete and Aetolia well into the Hellenistic 
period (cf. Thuc. 1.5.3).11 Beyond Greece proper, similar social structures and 
behavioural codes existed in the Adriatic; Polybius’ (2.8.8) account of the 
Illyrians under Teuta provides a close parallel for a nascent state that still had not 
extended its reach over warships and their use. Her reply to the shocked Roman 
embassy – that it was not the nomimon of the Illyrian monarchs to prevent their 
subjects from enriching themselves at sea – is symptomatic of a wider archaic 
worldview that saw the plundering of foreigners by private individuals as beyond 
the remit of the central authority.12 From a fairly early period the Etruscans 
(Tyrrhenians) were also involved in plundering raids in both the Adriatic and 
Aegean, and appear as a serious concern for Athenian policy in the fourth century 
BC (Giuffrida Ientile, 1983).- 
An exception to these traditional forms of piracy was the efflorescence of 
piracy in Cilicia during the second and first centuries BC:  its social makeup was 
                                                   
10 Gabrielsen, 2001, p. 115-228; 2003, p. 401-403; 2013a, p. 138-147. 
11 Cf. Gabrielsen, 2003, p. 403: “Ultimately, therefore, it was neither political oppression nor 
poverty that created the predator. Indeed, historically, he had been there all along and continued 
to enjoy a thriving existence”. On piracy as spearheaded by elites in traditional regions, not social 
outcasts, see further Gabrielsen, 2013a, p. 138: “there is sufficient evidence to show that the cradle 
of piracy was situated at the upper echelons of sociopolitical structure, whether we call those 
privileged elites aristocracies or powerholders. It may well be that many of the persons who 
manned the benches of pirate craft came from the ranks of the destitute and downtrodden. But 
those commanding the resources needed for owning, maintaining and operating such craft, and 
also for organizing raiding expeditions, almost certainly belonged to a distinctly higher social 
class”. 
12 See Davies (2004) for a case study, focusing on the career of the Illyrian warlord Demetrius of 
Pharos. 
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quite different, a product of the stresses caused by tectonic shifts among the 
polities of the Hellenistic Eastern Mediterranean. As Nicholas Rauh (1992) has 
shown, the Cilician pirates attracted elements of the Mediterranean maritime 
mob in a manner not dissimilar to early eighteenth century Atlantic piracy; their 
tactics began, however, along traditional lines and only later developed to mimic 
those of an established state.13 The period thus covered in this study saw pirate 
crews from a variety of regions at large in the Aegean and operating for a variety 
of reasons, with diachronic shifts in the intensity of raids from this or that 
quarter. 
 
1.1. Pirate Galleys: The Tools of the Trade 
 
The technology in the hands of pirate crews reflected the traditional 
social structures from which much of this activity emerged. Already in the fifth 
century BC, when describing the ships of the Trojan War, Thucydides (1.10.4) 
refers to them as not being like the modern warships of his day, ἀλλὰ τῷ παλαιῷ 
τρόπῳ λῃστικώτερον παρεσκευασμένα, that is, fitted out in the old-fashioned 
manner of pirate vessels. Their small size (rarely requiring more than fifty 
oarsmen) and light build (rarely requiring bronze rams: see infra) fitted perfectly 
the requirements of their practitioners: speed, agility, and concealment. Besides, 
the archaic custom of dividing booty equally (after setting aside choice prizes for 
leaders) meant that larger crews meant smaller individual shares.14 Yet these 
vessels were far from antiques, nor did their technological development end in 
the archaic period. Several new developments illustrate ongoing refinement of 
these archaic technologies to perform optimally their more specialised role in the 
classical and Hellenistic period as maritime predators whose prey was shipping 
and coastal communities.15 States too found these vessels useful for irregular 
warfare.16 For these purposes, such vessels were, as J.K. Davies (1984, p. 286) 
                                                   
13 For Cilicia as a rogue state see Avidov (1998); but the Cilicians’ gradual acquisition of state-like 
trappings does not mean that their reputation for piracy should be dismissed as Roman 
chauvinism and propaganda. 
14 Van Wees, 1992, p. 299-310. This practice persisted among pirates: Ferone, 1997, p. 145-148. 
15 Early archaic long ships had to compromise on this principle as they were also used for regular 
trade: see Hdt. 1.163 on Phocaean pentekontoroi. 
16 Casson, 1995a, p. 123-135; Gabrielsen, 1997, p. 90-91. 
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aptly puts it, “in the vanguard of military progress”. Four aphract vessel types vie 
for special comment: the hemiolia, myoparon, lembos, and liburna. 
The hemiolia (“one-and-a-half-er”) is first mentioned in sources from the 
late fourth century BC. Theophrastus’ stereotypical coward is one who, when at 
sea, imagines that the headlands that hove into view are hemioliai (Char. 25.2). 
In terms of technical details we are dependent on the name itself: “one-and-a-
half-er” surely derives from the vessel’s rowing arrangement, for which there are 
several possible reconstructions.17 One elegant solution to this riddle has the crew 
rowing all on one level, with a full file of oarsmen along each gunwale and a half-
file either side amidships (where the beam is broadest) working in the interstices 
between the outer file’s oars. Figure 1 shows J. F. Coates’ reconstruction of a 
hemiolia based on this theory.18 This reconstruction fits with Hesychius’ 
description (s.v. ἡμιολία) of the hemiolia as dikrotos, viz. with two longitudinal 
files of oarsmen per side (Morrison, 1980, p. 122-123). Arrian, in his discussion 
of Alexander’s navigation of the Indus, mentions hemioliai among the 
triakontoroi (Arr. Anab. 6.5.1); these perhaps utilised a full file of ten oarsmen 
and a half-file of five oarsmen on each side, totalling thirty oarsmen in all. As with 
all of these vessel types, however, the number of oarsmen was not fixed but might 
vary from craft to craft. It is unlikely that hemioliai normally bore bronze rams.19  
The Cilician pirates began their depredations with small vessels utilising 
traditional pirate tactics (Plut. Pomp. 24). According to Appian (Mith. 92), they 
first used hemioliai and myoparones; eventually their power grew to such an 
extent that they developed the forces and tactics of a fully-fledged state, including 
large warships and the use of siege warfare. The latter tactics are not of immediate 
concern here since they represent exceptional rather than quotidian practices.20 
More to the point is the mention - besides the hemiolia - of the myoparon, 
                                                   
17 See Casson, 1958; Morrison 1980; Gabrielsen, 1997, p. 89-90; Ferone, 1997, p. 127-133. 
18 This reconstruction would be capable of around seven and a half knots at a sprint: Morrison e 
Coates, 1996, p. 317-319. 
19 Appian (Mith. 92) writes that the Cilician pirates first used hemioliai and myoparones, then 
later dikrotoi and triereis (by dikrotoi he probably means two-level vessels, not double-filed, 
single-level vessels.) He presents a figure of 71 vessels captured and 306 surrendered during 
Pompey’s campaign (App. Mith. 96). If Plutarch (Pomp. 28) is correct in reporting that 90 of the 
surrendered vessels bore rams (surely the dikrotoi and triereis), then there would have been 287 
ramless galleys in use by the Cilicians in 67 BC, most likely made up (for the most part) of 
hemioliai and myoparones. 
20 See Avidov, 1998; cf. Rauh, 1998.. 
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another small, swift pirate vessel mentioned on numerous occasions in our 
sources for piracy in the 2nd-1st centuries BC, most notoriously when the pirate 
chief Heracleo sailed four myoparones into the harbour of Syracuse under the 
nose of Sicily’s ineffectual governor Verres (Cic. Verr. 2.5.96-8).21 Little is known 
of its design, save that it was a single-level galley and did not usually bear a bronze 
ram.22  
 
  
The vessel par excellence of Illyrian raiders was the lembos, a term that 
we first encounter in fourth century Attic sources in relation to tenders for 
merchant vessels23, but which in an Illyrian context refers to a specific kind of 
raiding galley (Medas, 2004). They were small, swift, and useful for carrying 
troops, qualities that led Philip V of Macedon to construct 100 of them, though 
they were less useful in traditional sea-battles (Plb. 5.109.1-3). Their crews 
                                                   
21 See also Plut. Luc. 13.3; Cic. Verr. 2.3.186, 2.5.73, 2.5.89; Sallust fr. 3.8 [Maurenbrecher]; Florus 
1.41.6.4-6. 
22 See n. 19, but cf. Cic. Verr. 2.1.86-90 for an exception. See further Casson, 1995a, p. 132; 
Morrison and Coates, 1996, p. 262. A myoparon appears in the Althiburus mosaic: Casson 
(1995a) fig. 137. The name, like that of the epaktrokeles discussed below, is a compound noun; it 
means something like “mouse-galley” (a paron being a type of small vessel: Plb. fr. 193; schol. Ar. 
Pax 142). 
23 Lycurg. Leoc. 17; Dem. 32.6; 34.10; Anaxandrides fr. 34.7 K-A. 
Fig. 3 - J. F. Coates’ Reconstruction of a Hemiolia. Source: Morrison and Coates, 1996, p. 318. 
Courtesy of the Trireme Trust. 
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numbered fifty or fewer, and they were normally single-level open galleys; some 
bore bronze rams.24 They became popular with pirates beyond the Adriatic.25 
Further north along the Adriatic coast lived the Liburnians, an Illyrian tribe who 
gave their name to the liburna, another famous raiding vessel that was adopted 
by the Roman fleet as a light craft (App. Ill. 3). The Roman version was rowed at 
two levels, as Lucan (3.534) and Appian (Ill. 3) make clear; an ancestor of this 
type is perhaps visible in the fifth century Nesactium relief.26 
 These four vessel types were more modern variants of the small, 
old-fashioned aphract raiding galleys that Thucydides knew; their capabilities 
will have been broadly similar. Some pirate crews, however, utilised another kind 
of vessel: fast variants of the merchant galley type, an intermediary form between 
the round-hulled merchant ship and the sleek war galley (Casson, 1995b). One 
type mentioned in fourth century sources (Aeschin. 1.191; Arist. Int. 16a26) is the 
epaktrokeles, a compound noun evidently based on a better-known kind of 
merchant galley, the keles, “racehorse”, itself used at times by pirates.27 The name 
alone is good evidence for its speed, but the difference between the epaktrokeles 
and the keles is difficult to establish, and we must fall back on the shaky grounds 
of etymology. Several solutions have been proposed, but perhaps the term meant 
nothing more than “hunter-keles”.28 The capabilities of such vessels were 
                                                   
24 In general, see Casson, 1995a, p. 125-127. Crew size: Plb. 2.3.1 has 5.000 Illyrians aboard 100 
lemboi, viz. 50 per lembos. Livy (34.35.5) mentions a lembos of 16 rowers, viz. 8 per side. Strabo 
(2.99) mentions a lembos the equivalent of a penteconter used by the explorer Eudoxus, and two 
smaller boats resembling pirate lemboi. In Strabo’s view, then, a pirate lembos was typically 
smaller than a penteconter. Single level: Livy (24.40.2) uses the term lembus biremibus on one 
occasion; the use of the modifier implies that they normally were single-level vessels. Polybius 
(5.101.2) writes of ἡμιόλιοι λέμβοι, lemboi rowed as hemioliai, also evidently exceptional. Ram: 
pace Casson, 1995a, p. 126 n. 107-108, the fact that Livy (32.32.9) writes of “five lemboi and a ship 
with a ram” implies that lemboi normally had no ram, but cf. App. Ill. 7 and Plb. 2.12.3 (λέμβοις 
… ἀνόπλοις), suggesting that ramless lemboi were not standard. 
25 Plautus (Bacch. 279-280) describes a long, staunch lembos chasing down a merchantman. Livy 
(37.27) has a flotilla of pirate lemboi and keletes fleeing to their base at Myonnesus in 190 BC. See 
also Alciphron 1.6.8; Anth. Pal. 5.44. Lemboi were relatively capacious (Plb. 2.8.4) and could be 
used as merchant galleys: Casson, 1995b, p. 122. It is generally supposed that the lembos was the 
vessel of choice of Aetolian pirates (Scholten, 2000, p. 107). 
26 See Panciera, 1956; Morrison e Coates, 1996, p. 316-317; Höckmann, 1997; Medas, 2004; 
Mihovilić, 2004. 
27 Keles: see Casson, 1995a, p. 160-162; Ferone, 1997, p. 124-126. Used by pirates: Thuc. 4.9.1; 
Livy 37.27. In Heliodorus’ Aethiopica (5.22-5) and Thucydides (4.67) pirates use a swift merchant 
galley type, an akation. The akation was also perhaps used in Hellenistic Crete (if Dindorf’s 
emendation at Diod. 31.38 is correct), as was a vessel called the mydion about which we know 
little; a rough depiction appears in the Althiburus mosaic (Casson, 1995a, fig. 137). See further 
Ferone, 1997, p. 120-124. 
28 Morrison & Williams (1968, p. 245) connect the word to the verb epagein and suggest a small 
keles that could be hoisted aboard a larger vessel, whilst Casson (1995a, p. 161) thought that the 
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somewhat different than those of the aphract galleys described above, with 
tactical implications that will be discussed below. 
 
1.2. The Pirate Galley at Work 
 
Let us now turn to how these vessels were used in practice. The factor of 
seasonality is fundamental: although recent work has shown the old view of a 
fixed sailing season from May to September to be overly rigid, winter sailing could 
not normally be attempted by most of the kinds of vessel here considered.29 It 
would therefore be a mistake to view Greek piracy as a full-time occupation, at 
least in most cases. It is equally vital to emphasise pirates’ reliance on land bases 
and their limited range. One reads of Early Modern pirate vessels crossing the 
Atlantic, rounding Africa and sailing into the Indian Ocean and the waters of Red 
Sea, staying at sea sometimes for many weeks without making a landfall 
(Konstam, 2003, p. 5-6).  Such feats were impossible for Greek pirates, who, like 
the skippers of Greek war galleys, had to beach their vessels more-or-less daily.30 
Although landfalls were vital, we know little about the knowledge that 
Greek pirates had of good bases. The speaker of [Dem.] 7.3 claims that “all pirates 
seize places belonging to other people and fortify them, and then from them do 
evil to others”. Indeed, a number of pirate bases are known from our sources.31 
                                                   
epaktrokeles was “probably designed with greater carrying capacity” than the keles. Although a 
derivation from epagein is certain, this derivation is clearly not direct: epaktrokeles must derive 
from a combination of keles and the term epakter, a word that derives itself from epagein but 
with the apophonic suffix –ter, and means “hunter” in Homeric Greek, in the sense of someone 
who ‘leads on’ prey into a trap (cf. Lytle 2018: 83 for the term in fishing). The variant epaktr- is 
the apophonic zero grade of the full grade ἐπακτέρ, which is attested also in the term epaktris 
used for a light vessel by Xenophon (Hell. 1.1.11). As Ferone (1997, p. 126) notes, Nicander (Ther. 
823-4) and Hesychius (s.v. ἐπακτρίδας) connect the term epaktris with fishing. At any rate, the 
term derives from the pursuit of prey, and as both Plato (Laws 823e) and Aristotle (Pol. 1256a35-
1256b1) liken piracy to hunting animals, it is unclear whether the term epaktrokeles should be 
associated more with hunting (human) prey or with a specific kind of fishing vessel (my thanks to 
Mirko Canevaro for discussion of this term).  
29 Beresford (2013, p. 237-243, but cf. p. 248-255: some pirates did manage to operate to a limited 
extent in wintertime). “[…] individual Aitolian raiders at this point were in the habit of setting off 
at the beginning of spring to harass hostile territories and shipping, just as did Illyrians” 
(Scholten, 2000, p. 150). 
30 Their small size and lack of a deck made them very vulnerable to rough seas, e.g. Diod. 31.45: a 
flotilla of Cretan raiders plunders Siphnos and sails off at night, but is wrecked in a gale. Cf. 
Arnaud, 2005, p. 34: “Même la piraterie, pour autant que l’on puisse analyser ce phénomène 
encore mal connu dans le détail, mais qui paraît avoir été particulièrement côtier, n’a 
probablement pas exercé une influence majeure sur les traversées en haute mer”. 
31 E.g. Alopeconnesus (Dem. 23.166), Halonnesus ([Dem.] 7.2), Euboea (Dem. 18.241), Cythnus 
(IG II2 682.10), Mycale (Plut. Mor. 303d), Myonnesus between Thessaly and Euboea (Aeschin. 
2.72), Myonnesus mod. Çifitkalesi Adasi (Livy 37.27; Ephorus FGrHist 70 F 27), Opous (Thuc. 
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Some of these were indeed fortified: Livy (37.27; cf. Plb. 21.12) writes of a pirate 
flotilla of about fifteen galleys, keletes and lemboi which, after plundering the 
coast of Chios in 190 BC and making off “with all manner of booty” (cum omnis 
generis praeda), ran into a Roman fleet. The pirates fled to their base at 
Myonnesus, ‘Mouse Island’ (mod. Çifitkalesi Adasi in Turkey), a rocky 
promontory jutting into the sea between Teos and Samos (ver Morrison and 
Coates, 1986, p. 107). Although the Romans pursued the raiders to their base, 
they kept their distance, not wishing to come into range of the pirates posted on 
the cliffs of the promontory, who were presumably armed with missile weapons 
(perhaps even artillery). Another notable pirate base was located on the island of 
Antikythera between Cythera and Crete, superbly situated on the sea-lanes 
passing between Crete and the southern Peloponnese. This base has been 
partially excavated.32  
At any rate, the important point to emphasise is the pirate’s heavy 
reliance on landfalls. When the Athenians sent a naval force to Caria and Lycia in 
430/29 BC to stop Peloponnesian pirates from using it as a base to raid 
commercial shipping entering the Aegean from Phoenicia and Phaselis, their 
actions presuppose that it was impractical for these pirates to operate from the 
Peloponnese itself (Thuc. 2.69; cf. 8.35). They needed a base closer to their 
hunting grounds.33 The principle is illuminated in unusual detail in an inscription 
from Syros dating to the early first century BC (IG XII 5.653 = Bielman, 1994, no. 
52), which honours a citizen of nearby Siphnos. News of pirates arrived in Syros, 
and it became clear that they had anchored near Siphnian territory (lines 12-13). 
They captured two slaves, Noumenios and Botrys, and landed them at a place 
named Eschatia (lines 25-28); the pirates then landed on an island opposite 
Siphnian territory (lines 28-29). Noumenios escaped, was captured by the 
honorand, and returned to his master in Syros (lines 29-33). The key point for 
our purposes is that the pirates’ attack was dependent on seizing small, 
presumably uninhabited islets near their main target and using them as bases, 
                                                   
2.32), Scyrus (Plut. Cim. 8.3), Lipari Islands (Livy 5.28.2), Tragia (Strab. 14.1.7) and Pharmacusa 
(Plut. Jul. 2). For the Cilicians’ network of landfalls and bases see Plut. Pomp. 24.3. 
32 See Johnston et al., 2012; Baika, 2013, p. 277-283. The Rhodians launched an expedition 
against Antikythera in the mid-third-century BC (Jacopi, 1932, p. 169 no. 1), almost certainly as 
an anti-pirate measure. 
33 Greek pirate galleys thus conformed to the broader limitations of Mediterranean galley usage: 
(see Pryor, 1995). 
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much in the manner described by Pseudo-Demosthenes (7.3). This dependence 
on a “friendly shore” was shared by Rhodes, the naval prostates (“protector”), 
whose technology and tactics were not greatly different to those of the pirates: 
Rhodes established a network of outposts, fanning out across the Aegean, that 
provided the military infrastructure for anti-pirate expeditions.34 
 As we noted earlier, Greek pirates might either chase down vessels 
at sea or make amphibious descents on coastal towns. We cannot determine the 
relative frequency of one versus the other kind of venture; our evidence is more 
heavily weighted towards the latter practice, but these tended to be larger events, 
more liable to be recorded, and more likely to generate honorific inscriptions if 
someone were to negotiate the ransom of the prisoners.35 One thing is certain: 
the lone pirate galley was less likely to make an amphibious raid than a flotilla of 
several vessels operating in tandem.36 Depending on its size, a coastal settlement 
might be too risky a target for the lone raider (though a quick razzia into the 
countryside somewhat less so); and even when we hear of attacks by several 
vessels, they tend to occur at night when the element of surprise lay with the 
pirates.37 If the flotilla were big enough, relatively large towns might even be 
raided: one inscription from the third century BC records an attack on Teos in 
which the pirates kidnapped a number of citizens and held the whole town to 
ransom for their safe return (SEG 44.949).38 Another (SIG3 520 = Bielman, 1994, 
no. 26) records the capture of some 280 people from Aulon on Naxos by Aetolian 
raiders. Some coastal communities targeted by pirates fared better: during a night 
raid by pirates on the harbour at Thera, the Ptolemaic garrison was able to repel 
the raiders from an area where some 400 people dwelt (IG XII.3 supp. no. 1291). 
On a rather more modest scale was the attack on the town of Aigiale on Amorgos 
by the pirate Sokleidas and his crew in the mid third century BC (SIG3 521 = 
Bielman, 1994, no. 38). They made a night raid into the surrounding countryside 
and carried off some thirty persons; they then proceeded to steal the ship of a 
                                                   
34 Gabrielsen, 1997, p. 40-42. On anti-pirate measures see also Zambon, 2004. 
35 Pace Casson, 1991, p. 178. Merchant vessels were often highly lucrative prizes, e.g. Lys. 23.25; 
Dem. 24.11-12; [Dem.] 34.37; Theopompus FGrH 115 F 292; cf. Philochorus FGrH 328 F 162, with 
Bresson, 2000, p. 131-149.  
36 Flotillas: e.g. Hom. Od. 14.248; cf. Thuc. 6.104; IG XII.3 supp. No. 1291.9; Arr. Anab. 3.2.3; 
Diod. 16.81.3; 20.97.5; 28.1; Plb. 5.95.1; Livy 37.11.6; 37.27.  
37 E.g. Hdt. 6.16.2; IG XII.3 supp. no. 1291.14; SIG3 521.5. 
38 Şahin, 1994; Hamon, 2018. 
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man named Doreios and scuttled the other ships in the harbour. We only know 
about this episode because two of the captives managed to negotiate the release 
of the citizen captives from Sokleidas (very probably for a hefty ransom, cf. Roy, 
2012, p. 53), and were honoured for their efforts with an inscription. Had this 
bargain not been struck, the kidnapped men, women and children would surely 
have ended up in the slave market of some Greek coastal town or city. 
 Chasing down a merchant vessel at sea presented a rather different 
prospect, one in which the seamanship of the pirate crew was a crucial factor.39 
But we also should bear in mind the capricious element of the weather. It is 
important to note a basic technological disparity between the hunter and its prey. 
The pirate galley held the advantage in calm weather: sail-dependent 
merchantmen were sitting ducks for predators whose oars allowed them to 
operate efficiently in such conditions, as this epigram illustrates: 
 
Chilling for sailors is the setting of the Kids, but for Pyron the calm was 
much more hostile than the tempest. For his ship, fettered by a lull in 
the wind, was run down by pirates in a swift double-banked galley. 
They killed him; he fled the storm only to meet destruction in the calm. 
Ah! A baneful, wretched, and unlucky harbour!40 
 
On the other hand, merchantmen could ride out choppy seas with greater ease, 
conditions that were extremely dangerous for less seaworthy pirate craft, 
particularly aphract raiding galleys (Beresford, 2013, p. 245). In between these 
two extremes the outcome of the chase could go either way. A late sixth century 
black-figure drinking cup from Attica presents a remarkable illustration of this 
scenario. It depicts a chase between an aphract raiding vessel and a merchant 
ship in two successive scenes. In the first scene, the merchant has his sails trussed 
up to the yard, presumably because of a stiff wind. Undeterred by these 
conditions, the galley bears down on its prey with its sails set and every man at 
his oar. In the second scene, the merchant has become aware of the danger and 
unfurled his sails in a bid to elude his would-be captor, but it appears to be in 
                                                   
39 Amateurs who tried their hand at piracy could come to a bad end (see Joseph. BJ 3.9.2 com 
Ormerod, 1924, p. 30-31). 
40 Anth. Pal. 7.640, first century BC. Ormerod, 1924, p. 16. Cf. Heliod. Aeth. 5.23-24 with 
Beresford, 2013, p. 246-247; Polyaenus 3.11.10, 5.13.1. 
David M. Lewis. Piracy and Slave Trading… 
91 
vain: some of the pirates have shipped their oars in order to shorten sail, and are 
preparing to board their victim.41 
 For pirates aboard merchant galley types, the situation was slightly 
different. In his Aethiopica, Heliodorus describes the pursuit of a merchantman 
by pirates using one of the merchant galley types noted above, an akation.42 His 
account usefully illustrates a variation from the situation (described above) 
concerning aphract raiding galleys. In the story, a merchant vessel has set out 
from Crete; the steersman has noticed an akation tailing her course and is 
worried that it might be crewed by pirates (5.22). Some of the passengers tell him 
not to worry: it is perfectly normal for small vessels to follow the course of larger 
merchant ships with more experienced navigators. But the fact that the akation’s 
crew are pirates soon becomes apparent: she tails the merchant vessel under sail 
as long as the wind allows it; when there is a lull, the merchantman is left dead in 
the water, and the pirates resort to their oars to run her down (5.23). Two 
observations on this passage are worth underscoring: first, the fact that these 
vessel types were usually employed for trade lent them a tactically valuable air of 
innocence not shared by the more obviously predatory aphract raiding galleys; 
second, their greater seaworthiness made them better suited to operating in 
windier conditions and on more protracted pursuits. 
How the final capture was achieved is somewhat unclear. The pirates who killed 
Lycon of Heraclea in the Saronic Gulf in the fourth century seem to have borne 
down on their victim with a hail of arrows (Dem. 52.5). It is possible that one of 
our best-preserved wrecks, the Kyrenia ship, was once the target of such a volley, 
as eight javelin tips were discovered embedded in her hull (ver Katzev and Womer 
Katsev, 1986, p. 4-5). Alternatively, the pirate might intimidate the merchant 
crew with a show of strength but offer to let them go free if they avoided a fight, 
as Heliodorus describes in his Aethiopica (5.24). Capture was most likely 
achieved with grapnels, cheires siderai (‘iron hands’), used as naval weapons in 
the eastern Mediterranean since the Bronze Age and employed in classical naval 
                                                   
41 My analysis follows Casson (1958, p. 16). One must make allowance for the small size of the cup, 
which necessitates some compression of the scene. Morrison’s (and Coates 1996, p. 183) claim  
that the scenes are unrelated due to a slight height difference in the oarsmen of the two scenes 
presupposes, in my opinion, too scientific an approach on behalf of the artist. 
42 The Greek novels include many colourful episodes involving pirates. In terms of verisimilitude 
some authors fare better than others. For example, Xenophon of Ephesus (1.13, rather 
improbably) has a crew of Phoenician pirates aboard a trireme posing as merchants. Others are 
more realistic in their depiction of seafaring (see e.g. Cvikel et al., 2014). 
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warfare.43 Philostratus (Imag. 1.19.3), indeed, when describing a painting of a 
pirate galley, mentions among its grisly arsenal grapnels for capturing its prey. 
 When it came to giving chase the pirate had to use every advantage to gain 
an edge over his victim: a lengthy pursuit would leave the rowers wilting at their 
oars, so there was a need to keep the chase as short and as certain as possible. 
One method that Aegean pirates of the early modern period resorted to involved 
concealing their vessel behind a headland, keeping watch for victims from the 
cliffs above, and pouncing at the opportune moment. It is described thus by an 
English sailor named Roberts: 
 
[…] they go to the Furnoes, and lie there under the high land, having a 
watch on the hill with a little flag, whereby they make a signal, if they 
see any sail: they slip out and lie athwart the Boak of Samos, and take 
their prize; they lie in the same nature under Necaria, and Gadronise 
[…].44 
 
The same ruse was known in antiquity, and appears as early as Homer. In the 
Odyssey, the suitors plot to murder Telemachus on his return to Ithaca, and fit 
out one of their galleys (Od. 4.842-7): 
 
the suitors went aboard and sailed out into the flowing 
ways, in their hearts devising sudden death for Telemachus. 
There is a rocky island there in the middle channel 
halfway between Ithaca and towering Samos, 
called Asteris, not large, but it has a double anchorage 
where ships can be hidden. There the Achaeans waited in ambush. 
 
However, their planned ambush fails to come off. As the suitor Antinoös bitterly 
comments: 
 
In the daytime we sat watchful along the windy headlands, 
always succeeding each other, but when the sun set, we never 
lay through the night on the dry land, but always on the open 
                                                   
43 Bronze Age: Wachsmann, 1998, p. 317-319; Classical period: Polyaenus 1.40.9; Diod. 13.50.5. 
See Casson, 1995a, p. 121-2. 
44 Hacke, 1699 cited from Ormerod, 1924, p. 17.  
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water, cruising on a fast ship, we waited for divine dawn, 
watching to ambush Telemachus, so that we could cut him 
off; but all the time some divinity brought him home (Od. 16.365-
70).45 
 
The trick is mentioned in several later authors too, in some cases 
explicitly associated with pirates.46 Its advantage is obvious, for not only does it 
deny the victim any knowledge about an impending attack until the last moment, 
but it also allows the chase to be as brief as possible leaving the crew enough 
energy to board the prize.47 
 
2. The Fate of the Captives 
 
Theophrastus may have thought the fevered imagination of the man at 
sea who mistook every headland for a hemiolia to be a mark of cowardice, but for 
sea-goers captured by a pirate galley or coastal-dwellers pounced upon in a pirate 
raid, real terrors lay in store. That is not to say that the merchantman’s 
submission was a fait accompli (notwithstanding the usual disparity in numbers 
between the two vessel types’ crews, skewed in favour of the pirates). Xenophon 
(Oec. 8.12) mentions that merchants carried arms to defend themselves at sea, 
and perhaps some larger, well-armed merchant vessels were too risky a target for 
a smaller pirate craft operating solo.48 Certainly, those merchants who could 
afford to take part in naval convoys organised by states such as Athens or Rhodes 
were extremely well protected against pirates at sea, who must have opted for less 
                                                   
45 Tr. Lattimore, adapted. The former passage is noted by Ormerod (1924, p. 19). 
46 For pirates see Eur. fr. 669 [Kannicht]; Heliod. Aeth. 5.20; naval tactic: Thuc. 7.4; 8.35; Arr. 
Anab. 2.1; Xen. Hell. 5.1.27; Hell.  Oxy. 4.1; Livy 37.28; Frontin. Str. 3.10.8. Cf. Beresford, 2013, 
p. 243-245. It could perhaps be a literal allusion to this practice that Douris of Samos (FGrH 76 
F13) makes when he compares the Aetolians to the Sphinx sitting perched upon a rock and 
carrying off any passers-by. 
47 Pirates might also seek to obtain intelligence about particularly lucrative targets: apparently, 
the inhabitants of Corycus would eavesdrop on sailors anchored in nearby ports and pass on 
intelligence about the richest prizes and their destinations to pirates operating out of Myonnesus, 
a notorious pirate nest located between Teos and Samos (cf. n. 30) in return for a cut of the loot 
(Ephorus FGrHist 70 F 27; Strab. 14.1.32; cf. Heliod. Aeth. 5.20). 
48 See further Gianfrotta, 1981. Ferone (1997, p. 121) points to Aristoph. Eq. 761, where the chorus 
encourage the Sausage Seller figuratively to protect himself by “raising the dolphin”, which 
Hesychius (s.v. δελφῖνες) and Eustathius (1221.25) gloss as a defensive device: “dolphins” were 
metal weights that could be dropped from the yardarm of a merchant vessel onto a pirate galley 
to smash through its hull.  
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prickly targets (Gabrielsen, 2001; 2013b, p. 73-76). Resisting pirates certainly 
made a good deal of sense: in the early modern age surrendering crews were often 
incorporated into the pirate’s crew49 – we have, it seems, one instance of this from 
the Hellenistic Aegean.50 But death or enslavement was a more frequent fate in 
antiquity. In some cases the victims were simply tossed into the sea to drown by 
pirates more interested in the cargo than enslaving the crew.51 Aristotle 
(Protrepticus fr. 106 [Ross]; cf. Photius s.v. δεσμοὶ Τυρρηνοί) mentions one 
particularly cruel practice, a form of psychological torture inflicted by the 
Tyrrhenians upon some of their victims, who would be bound face-to-face with 
rotting corpses.52 
 The principal aim of pirate crews, though, was to turn a profit; and 
this brings us to the quandary noted at the beginning of this essay: should the 
captives be sold or ransomed? In an important contribution, Gabrielsen (2003, 
p. 394) has argued that the latter “was both substantial and the pirates’ favourite”, 
and de Souza (1999, p. 65) has argued that ransom “may even have been the 
principal aim of much piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean”. Indeed the evidence 
is unequivocal that ransoming citizens back to their kin was much more lucrative 
than selling them into slavery (Gabrielsen, 2003, p. 393-394). However, several 
pragmatic considerations, following from the pattern of practice outlined above, 
ought to be taken into consideration; and these may lead one to question whether 
ransom was usually a practical option for pirate crews with a newly-seized haul 
of captives. 
 The first is a problem Gabrielsen (1997, p. 85-111; 2001, passim) has 
written on at length: the role of the naval prostates. Although it is true that it was 
not in the prostates’ interest to eradicate piracy entirely,53 states such as Rhodes 
posed a serious threat to pirate crews, who might not have the time to enter into 
                                                   
49 Mariners were mainly from the lower reaches of the working class, whose families had not the 
resources to ransom them; and there was no market for kidnapped white mariners as slaves in 
the Americas (Rediker, 2004, p. 38-59). 
50 IG XII.3 no. 328 = Bielman, 1994, no. 54. Discussed at length in Ager (1998). 
51 Anth. Pal. 7.654; Plut. Pomp. 24. State navies could act as cruelly (Xen. Hell. 2.1.31). One Greek 
term for pirate, katapontistes, literally means ‘drowner.’  
52 Note that Aristotle had made a particular study of Tyrrhenian customs (Athen. 1.23d) This 
Italian form of torture is more vividly related by Virgil (Aeneid 8.485-488). 
53 “[…] the chaser and those chased were tangled into an intricate relationship of mutual 
dependence within the same economic and political structure. Elimination of seaborne predatory 
activity would inevitably mean that the production of protection no longer constituted a paying 
proposition” (Gabrielsen, 2001, p. 228). 
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negotiations with the relatives of their captives, and may have had to forgo the 
more profitable option in order to outrun pursuit. As Gabrielsen (2001, p. 237) 
himself has written, “we are too focused on the victims and captives of the pirates 
to fully appreciate the fact that the raider’s work was not done before he had 
brought his loot safely to the market, that is, without meeting the ships of the 
naval prostates; as a profession, leisteia was not entirely free of occupational 
hazards”. 
Perhaps more significant than the naval prostates, however, is the fact 
that the targets of pirate raids were hardly helpless: small poleis and coastal 
settlements remained armed and dangerous well into the Hellenistic period (Ma, 
2000, especially p. 345-361). Inscriptions relating descents by pirates on coastal 
communities often bear this out. SEG 24.154 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 24; cf. SEG 
25:155 = Bielman, 1994, no. 30) honours an Athenian strategos stationed at 
Rhamnous who protected the surrounding countryside during a pirate raid. 
Although some persons were captured, he managed to ransom them; but the list 
of his military preparations shows what the pirates were up against: a garrison 
along with kryptoi stationed at special vantage points, as well as guard towers 
and dogs. IG XII.3 supp. no. 1291, noted above, describes how a Ptolemaic 
garrison successfully repelled an attack by pirates on Thera. SIG3 521 (= Bielman, 
1994, no. 38), also noted above, describes a raid by the pirate Sokleidas and his 
crew on Amorgos; the fact that they scuttled all of the ships in the harbour implies 
that the locals would not have cowered impotently, but would have pursued the 
pirates if they had the means. IG XII.3 171 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 51) is particularly 
rich in detail, and describes a piratical descent on the territory of Ephesus in 
which people and property were carried off from the vicinity of the temple of 
Artemis Mounychia. On information provided by the Ephesians, individuals from 
the nearby island of Astyplalea sailed against the pirates, captured many of them, 
and rescued the Ephesian captives. The pirates were punished “as befitted their 
wickedness”.54 This example shows that pirates, despite having valuable captives 
in their power, were not necessarily in a secure position. One might note that the 
position of the pirate crew would be much less secure once a ransom had been 
agreed and the captives returned to their kin; for by this point the pirates would 
                                                   
54 Gabrielsen (2003, p. 398) suggests that they were sold into slavery. Alternatively, they may have 
been executed. On punishments for pirates see Ferone, 1997, p. 154-156). 
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have lost their main point of leverage forestalling retributive action from the 
victim community. Hellenistic Chios, indeed, seems to have maintained a force 
of leistophylakika ploia, vessels that specialised in protection from pirates 
(Skarlatidou, 1993, p. 155-158). What these examples illustrate is that in many 
cases the pirates were not secure enough in their position to wait around to 
negotiate a profitable ransom deal, but had to make off in a hurry.55 It was 
perhaps only in exceptional cases that the pirates were able to do so. 
 Second is the impetus from which the decision to ransom emerged. 
The epigraphic evidence contains very few instances of pirates visibly aiming at 
ransom from the outset. An excellent (and rare) exception is SEG 44.949, dating 
to the third century BC, which records the collection of a colossal ransom (10% of 
the citizens’ wealth) from Teos: the pirates had raided the town, seized many 
citizens, and in de Souza’s (1999, p. 68) words, “arranged for the Teians to 
supervise their own ransacking, saving themselves much time, effort and danger 
by having the plunder collected and delivered to them”. That they could allow the 
citizens nearly a month to gather the ransom shows their confidence in their 
position; the pirates’ force must have been formidable. 
Far more common, however, are cases where captives were carried off to 
be sold in the first instance, and either (i) a well-meaning third party intervened 
and arranged for their ransom and return, or (ii) the home city of the captives 
dispatched an embassy to the home city of the pirates to broker a ransom. In some 
cases the ransom was not negotiated with the captors at all, but set up after the 
captives had been sold into slavery. Their new owners, sniffing an opportunity to 
make far more money from the captive than what they had paid for them as a 
slave, consented, and letters were dispatched to broker the ransom.56  
The importance of the intervention of euergetai can be seen in Dem. 
57.18, where we learn of an Athenian captured towards the end of the 
Peloponnesian War, who ended up serving as a slave in Leucas in western Greece. 
After many years in slavery, during which he picked up a foreign accent, he met 
                                                   
55 Julius Caesar’s 38 days on Pharmacusa as a captive of Cilician pirates (Plut. Jul. 2.2) occurred 
at a time when the Cilicians held mastery of the sea. The same conditions cannot be assumed of 
the third or most of the second century BC. Jim Roy (2012, p. 58) points out to me that in SIG3 
521 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 38) the captives are parthenoi and gynaikes, and that the threat of rape 
meant that getting captive women back quickly was an urgent concern of their families.  
56 Gabrielsen (2003, p. 394) rightly compares these to the fate of Nicostratus in [Dem.] 53. On 
this case see Sosin, 2017. 
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by chance with an actor named Cleander, who arranged for his ransom and 
return. Although this case did not involve pirates, it shows how ransom 
negotiations might be entered into not between the original captor and the family 
or polis of the captive, but at a later point in time through the intervention of a 
third party. Numerous late-Classical and Hellenistic inscriptions concerning 
piracy fit this pattern. 
Such may be the case with IG II2 284 (= Bielman 1994 no. 5), the full 
circumstances behind which are not fully clear. Here, Athens honours Cleomis of 
Methymna for arranging the release of a number of citizens captured by pirates. 
Evidently, the pirates had not brokered ransom negotiations directly with the 
Athenians: the release of the captives was effected by the intervention of Cleomis. 
It is unclear whether or not the citizens had first been sold. Very similar is IG II2 
399 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 6), in which Athens honours Eurylochus for arranging 
the ransom and return of a number of Athenian citizens taken to Cydonia on 
Crete. The Cretan connection makes piracy very likely. There is no mention of 
sale, but again it is the agency of an euergetes that effects the return of the 
captives. The situation is comparable to SIG3 535 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 31), where 
Athens honours Eumaridas of Cydonia for arranging the ransom and return of 
numerous citizens who had been captured by Boukris and brought to Crete. 
Boukris was probably an Aetolian pirate (Scholten, 2000, p. 109); but it is unclear 
if he was using Crete as a base from which to arrange the ransom with Athens, or 
as a market to dispose of his captives as slaves, after which point Eumaridas 
intervened. 
Knoepfler, Eretria XI 317.18 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 29) is a decree of 
Eretria honouring Eudemus of Acarnania for liberating Eretrian prisoners. In the 
view of Bielman (1994, p. 113), the most likely scenario is that the prisoners were 
captives of Aetolian pirates, sold in Acarnania, at which point Eudemus 
intervened and arranged their ransom and release. The fact that Eudemus had 
arranged for the release of some but not all of the captives (line 7) suggests that 
they had been sold to various owners rather than held together in expectation of 
a general ransom. The situation is clearer in IG XI 4.1054 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 
32): here, Theangela honours Semos, a Delian citizen who bought numerous 
slaves, the booty of a pirate raid. Semos discovered that two of them were women 
from a distinguished family in Theangela, and released them. McCabe, Theangela 
1 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 40) is a decree of Troezen honouring Aristeides of 
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Theangela, and concerns the liberation of an individual, Charmadas, who had 
been enslaved by Aetolians: Aristeides, learning of Charmadas’ fate, of his own 
initiative and at his own expense bought him and repatriated him. Bielman (1994, 
p. 149-150), surely correctly, views these Aetolians as pirates. In all of these cases, 
there is no sign that the pirates had aimed at ransom from the outset; instead, the 
ransom was brokered at a later point through the agency of a third party. 
Then there are instances where the polis of the captives proactively 
dispatched an embassy to the home city of the pirates, in order to arrange for the 
captives’ return. In SIG3 244 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 26), Aulon on Naxos honours 
several of its citizens who had served as ambassadors and had secured the ransom 
of 280 persons seized in a raid by Aetolians. An embassy despatched to secure the 
release of captives is also mentioned in a partially damaged decree of Samothrace 
(IG XII 8.159 = Bielman, 1994, no. 47). IG XII.3 no. 328 (= Bielman, 1994, no. 
54) is a difficult document, a letter concerning individuals from Thera who had 
been captured by pirates from Allaria on Crete. Three years later they had been 
freed and given land in Allaria. The captives seem actually to have joined the 
pirates in their activities, though they apparently did not share in the booty. For 
our purposes, they key point is that the inscription documents diplomatic efforts 
to repatriate the Theran captives at a much later point in time.57 
Finally, we have the instance, mentioned above, of SIG3 521 (= Bielman, 
1994, no. 38), where the impetus to set up a ransom deal came from two of the 
captives, who convinced (συνέπεισαν, line 15) the pirate captain Sokleidas to 
release the captives, presumably for a ransom. Again, we see that the impetus to 
broker a ransom came not from the pirates but from other parties.   
In sum, the majority of our inscriptions show pirate crews making off 
quickly with their haul of captives and selling them into slavery. One question 
quickly springs to mind: is this evidence representative of reality? Not so in 
Gabrielsen’s (2003, p. 394) view: “what we do have a record of are precisely those 
cases which, by their very nature, were habitually deemed meritorious to be 
publicized on inscriptions: that is, the intervention of benefactors, collective or 
individual. What we totally lack (and shall probably never get) is epigraphic 
evidence for the presumably far superior number of cases of captives being 
bought back by their own families, something usually not publicized through 
                                                   
57 Fuller discussion and a novel interpretation in Ager, 1998. 
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inscriptions”. One can hardly disagree58; but it is important to add a further point, 
viz. that just as the epigraphic record fails to capture such instances of privately-
brokered ransom, so too must it fail to capture those instances where captives 
were sold into slavery. The argument about what the epigraphical record leaves 
in the dark thus cuts in both directions. 
My point is not that firm conclusions on the frequency of ransom versus 
sale can be reached given the state of our sources. Rather, it is that the possibility 
of sale should not be underestimated, and that risk as much as profit likely 
governed the pirate crew’s decisions in any given instance. The fact that 
Hellenistic poleis expended much effort to protect their citizens from sale as 
slaves59 suggests that enslavement and sale was a very grave risk. 
 
2.1. Marketing Captives 
 
This brings us to the final link in the supply chain in which the pirate crew 
played a direct role: the sale of captives in slave markets. The first pragmatic issue 
for this stage of the process was the transport of captives; as noted above, most of 
the craft utilised by pirates (with the exception of merchant galley types) were not 
built for carrying cargo. The keletes and lemboi mentioned by Livy as operating 
out of Myonnesus in 190 BC would have been better placed to carry booty than 
vessels such as myoparones and hemioliai (see n. 25 and 27). According to 
Hypereides (On Protection Against the Tyrrhenians fr. 166 [Blass]), Tyrrhenian 
pirates used, alongside their galleys, special ships called komistika ploia, 
‘transport ships’, which Hesychius glosses as auxiliary vessels for transporting 
captured loot. We lack evidence for similar strategies pursued by Greek pirates – 
although the fact that Sokleidas’ gang in SIG3 521 stole the ship of Doreios may 
similarly be due to their haul of over 30 captives, who may not have been easy to 
carry away on the vessel(s) in which the pirates arrived. At any rate, the 
technology at the disposal of pirates may have influenced their preference for 
human captives over other kinds of booty, for the former had a very favourable 
                                                   
58 Although one practical point: can we imagine pirates conducting simultaneously many 
negotiations with the families of each individual captive seized in a raid? This would have 
complicated the process of negotiation immensely. 
59 See Kvist, 2003 for Cretan grants of asylia; more generally, see Roy, 2012. 
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bulk and weight to value ratio, and could be rapidly moved on board prior to a 
hasty getaway (Gavriljuk, 2003, p. 79-80). 
 Rostovtzeff’s (1941, p. 196) remark that pirates “were welcomed in all 
commercial ports when they appeared laden with their booty” is unsatisfactory 
for several reasons. First, it looks very much like an unwarranted extrapolation of 
Strabo’s (14.5.2) remarks about late Hellenistic Delos. Second, it ignores openly 
hostile poleis such as Athens and Rhodes (at the least) which were no friends to 
the pirate crew. Third, it is doubtful that most commercial ports would be 
anything other than alarmed by the arrival of a flotilla of craft of the sort described 
above, which further suggests the additional use of general merchant vessels for 
disposing of captives in ports other than the home ports of the pirate crews (in 
e.g. Crete or Aetolia). In other words, pirates may well have seized more innocent-
looking craft (such as the ship of Doreius noted in SIG3 521) or utilised more 
practical craft (such as the Tyrrhenian komistika ploia) if they intended to market 
their captives somewhere other than their home ports. A further possibility, 
though one for which we lack evidence, lies in contacts between pirate crews and 
slave traders, which could allow the pirate to dispose of his haul of captives 
without the risk of sailing to a given port (Gabrielsen, 2003, p. 394). It is a mark 
of the difficulty of the evidence that the significance of this option, potentially 
important, cannot be assessed on the evidence that we have. Nevertheless, we do 
hear of ports welcoming pirates and providing a market for pirate booty: two 
fifth-century Athenian inscriptions explicitly forbid allied poleis from doing this 
(IG I3 67.7-9; 75.6-10), and in the following century we hear complaints that the 
Thasians and Melians had done precisely such a thing (Dem. 12.2; 58.56). How 
did pirate crews know where they would find a safe harbour and market for their 
captives, beyond returning to their home ports? 
 A comprehensive answer is not possible; but some considerations on the 
identity of pirate crews and especially their leaders may suggest fruitful lines of 
enquiry. As Gabrielsen has shown, it is a mistake to view the social context of 
most (pre-Cilician) piracy in the Aegean in terms of marginal or excluded groups. 
Pirate galleys were, by and large, owned, fitted out, and their crews led by elite 
men from Greek communities that never gave up the archaic practices and 
attitudes of private raiding. Their predilection for raiding should not been seen 
as an exclusive role. Even in Homer (Od. 1.184) a raider chief can also be a trader 
in metals. Likewise, it is well known that early Greek mercenaries were recruited 
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not from an “open market” but through aristocratic xenia networks (whence the 
word xenos gained the auxiliary meaning of “mercenary”). The same individuals 
could toggle between these different roles and identities as and when required. 
The best way to explain the later situation is in terms of long-term continuities 
from the archaic era, where leading men could go raiding with their hetairoi, help 
out one of their guest friends by supplying them with armed men (themselves and 
their hetairoi) in return for a misthos, and indeed dabble in trade. 
 This multiplicity of roles that individuals from traditional regions might 
switch between is evident in Classical and Hellenistic sources. For instance, there 
is no reason to think that the social origins of Cretan mercenaries – much in 
demand as archers who specialised in skirmishing tactics over broken ground – 
were any different from Cretan pirates.60 The early-Hellenistic archipeiratai are 
another case in point. We hear of a number of such “pirate chiefs” serving as 
mercenaries in the wars of the Successor Kingdoms (ver Gabbert, 1986). Some 
have suggested that these were “ex-pirates” (Gabbert, 1986, p. 160), but that is to 
mistake the nature of the problem: the Greek terms leistes and peirates were not 
legal statuses or categorisations bestowed for violating international law, but 
were terms used for functional reasons connected with the strategy of the 
plundering raid. This might include individuals that made this their habitual 
activity (i.e. pirates sensu stricto); but the same terminology could be used for 
troops of states at war who resorted to the tactics of the plundering raid, or 
individuals who practised plundering raids for a limited period of time before 
reverting to more “formal” methods of warfare.  
 My point here is that we should not assume that early Greek traders, 
mercenaries, and pirates were always distinct occupations practised by different 
individuals. As Luraghi (2006) has shown, the same individual could toggle 
between each role. The same was probably true in later times, and this may 
provide the key for understanding how pirate crews were able to dispose of their 
booty in markets other than their home ports. For these crews were generally not 
(Tyrrhenians excepted) barbarian outsiders intruding into the Greek world, but a 
long-established component of it. Just as enterprising elite men of the archaic 
                                                   
60 Training in irregular warfare: Plat. Leg. 625c-626b; Ephorus FGrHist 70 F 149; Cretan 
mercenary archers: Thuc. 6.25.2; 6.43; 7.57.9-10; Xen. Anab. 1.2.9; 3.3.7; 3.3.15; 3.4.17; 4.2.27-8; 
5.2.29-32; Hell. 4.2.16; 4.7.6; Plb. 4.20.6-12; 4.54-5; 4.67.3; 4.68.3; 5.3.2; 5.14.1; 5.79.10; 17.57.4; 
20.85.3; Arr. Anab. 1.8.3-5; 2.7.7-8; 2.9.3; 3.5.6. On Cretan piracy in general, see Brulé, 1978. 
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period were typically well-travelled and well-connected with their peers 
elsewhere in the Aegean world, their successors in traditional Greek communities 
of later periods probably had social connections in other regions, and carried a 
fund of knowledge on landfalls, safe harbours, legitimate and lucrative targets, 
and friendly markets. It was such connections that enabled them to be in contact 
with, for example, Hellenistic kings in need of their expertise in irregular warfare; 
or indeed, in touch with states such as Athens, as was the Euboean condottiere 
and warlord Charidemus, who was accused of starting his career as a mercenary 
light-infantryman before acquiring a pirate ship and preying on Athens’ allies 
(Dem. 23.148). Aetolians and the Aetolian koinon of the third century BC were 
thoroughly familiar with (and connected to) the broader Aegean world (Funke, 
2008). Even in fairly developed regions, the temptation for leading men to resort 
to the old-fashioned life of a raider was hardly out of the question: such was the 
decision of the Phocaean admiral Dionysius following the Battle of Lade (Hdt. 
6.17), and in later centuries we find so-called pirate leaders from various poleis 
including Miletus (Xen. Hell. 2.1.30), Chalcis (Livy 31.22), Sparta (Livy 37.13.11-
14.1; Plb. 5.3.7), and Methymna (Arr. Anab. 3.2.4). Even in fourth-century 
Athens, one individual seems to have acquired a naval-surplus trireme and 
headed with it to Crete to serve as a mercenary commander (Casson, 1995c). In 
such instances the distinction between war and piracy was murky, and slippage 
between the two could easily occur. The difference was not between the 
individuals who practised these activities, but was a matter of their tactics, 
targets, and relations with states at war at a given point in time. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Thinking away our received cultural baggage associated with Atlantic 
piracy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is crucial for grasping the 
social character and practical operation of piracy in the ancient Greek world. 
Rather than representing moral or economic breakdown, privately-organised 
raiding was, generally speaking, a traditional activity that certain Greek 
communities simply never gave up – although Greeks who penned most of our 
sources came from more economically and politically advanced communities that 
found such practices backwards, abhorrent, and illegitimate. Nevertheless, piracy 
was a fundamental component of the ancient Greek economy. It redistributed 
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commodities by force more often than destroying them altogether; but it also 
actively commoditised human beings, tearing them from the ships on which they 
sailed or the coastal communities in which they lived and turning them literally 
into “human capital” that could be traded in slave markets. That is not to say that 
piracy was a straightforwardly productive feature of the ancient economy: it 
certainly raised transaction costs for interstate trade,61 never mind blighting the 
lives and fortunes of their victims and their victims’ communities. At any rate, 
study of its practical aspects underscores its importance to the history of labour 
in the Greek world; for not only did piracy involve skilled work itself, but it also 
produced labour through the enslavement of its victims. The ransom market did 
to some degree siphon off a proportion of those captives and return them to their 
kin; but it likely that the stock in trade of the typical pirate crew was enslavement, 
theft, and murder; a pursuit that was followed each summer in the Eastern 
Mediterranean for centuries until the fleet of Pompey brought it to an end in 67 
BC. 
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